Il concetto di monade nella fenomenologia = The concept of monad in phenomenology

Abstract

The concept of "monad" in phenomenology, particularly in Husserl's thought, is both intriguing and controversial. On one hand, the use of the term seems obvious, given its grounding in research on intersubjectivity; on the other, it presents problems related to its metaphysical connotations, risking the suggestion of a solipsism that Husserl himself sought to avoid. Husserl retrieves the monad, typically associated with Leibniz's metaphysics, to explore subjectivity as a dynamic and complex unity, moving beyond a static view of consciousness. In this context, the monad is seen as a way to express the relationship between ego, cogito, and cogitatum, opening up a deeper understanding of experience. Despite recent critiques, it is unclear whether Husserl's monadology can genuinely evade the metaphysical implications tied to Leibniz's concept. Therefore, it is essential to interpret Husserl's monad primarily in epistemological terms, using it to address metaphysical questions without reaching definitive answers. A schematic evaluation of the concept of the monad in Husserl may shed light on its meaning, limits, and implications within the phenomenological context.