Giudicare secondo Hannah Arendt

Autori

  • Giorgio Rizzo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1285/i18285368aXXXIIIn96p153

Parole chiave:

Arendt, Politics, Judgment, World, Representation, Foundation

Abstract

The aim of this essay is to point out that Arendt's theory of judgment rests on some theoretical bias without which it cannot be exercised. These "transcendental" conditions belong to different ontological domains that include thinking, action, world, culture and so on. So understood, Arendt's theory of judgment constitutes a theoretical "bridge" that links together what other researchers view as "discontinuities" in Arendt's thought.

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Pubblicato

19-07-2019

Fascicolo

a. XXXIII n.s., n. 96 (2019)

Sezione

Articoli

Licenza

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